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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NONRESIDENTS AND
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
OF ARTICLE IV
GARY J. SIMsoN t
Since its initial attempts in the mid-to-late 1800s to interpret
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV-"The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States" '-the Supreme Court has modified
materially its express method of analyzing claims arising under the
clause. Its operative method, however, has remained relatively
unchanged.
Through the early part of the twentieth century, the Court
expressly treated as critical a question framed and assigned overriding importance in Corfield v. Coryell,2 a leading circuit court
decision of 1823: is the privilege or immunity at issue one of "those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
3
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments"?
Thus, according to the Court, laws were unconstitutional that disf Professor of Law, University of Texas; Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell
University. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, Yale University.
I am grateful to Russell Weintraub, Henry Monaghan, and Rosalind Simson
for various helpful suggestions.
1 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The privileges and immunities clause of
article IV should not be confused with the privileges or immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States .

. .

.").

While the former provision deals with discrimination as

to rights recognized by state law, the latter addresses deprivations of rights national
in origin. For discussion of the privileges or immunities clause, see Kurland, The
Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round At Last"?, 1972 WAsu. U.
L.Q. 405; McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment,
4 IowA L. BuLL. 219 (1918).
2 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
3 Id. 551. Although the court in Corfield listed freedom from discriminatory
taxation as a fundamental right, id. 552, it generally appeared to attach no significance to whether or not the state discriminated against nonresidents with respect
to fundamental rights. Under the court's thinking, if the state interfered with
nonresidents' enjoyment of a fundamental right, it violated the privileges and
immunities clause even if it interfered equally with residents' enjoyment of the
particular right.

See id. 551-52; L. TIBE, AMEmcAN CONST=UONAL LAw § 6-32,

at 405-06 (1978) (identifying this ingredient of the Corfield court's approach and
explaining it as an attempt to constitutionalize a natural rights philosophy). At
the outset, the Supreme Court made clear its contrary understanding: that the
threshold issue in any privileges and immunities case is whether or not the state
disadvantages nonresidents relative to residents. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869); Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 594 (1856).
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advantaged persons who make their home in other states as to acquiring property, 4 making contracts, 5 or exercising other "fundamental" rights; 11laws were valid that disadvantaged out-of-staters
as to engaging in occupations intimately related to the public's wellbeing, 7 sharing in various natural resources, 8 or exercising other
"nonfundamental" rights. In practice, however, the Court did not
adhere strictly to its announced approach. By subterfuges of several
kinds, it avoided striking down a number of classifications that disadvantaged nonresidents 10 with regard to fundamental rights but
served lawful state goals with reasonable precision."
See, e.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
5 See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871).
6 See B. HowELL., Tim. PaIVILEcs ANT) IMMuNrrms OF STATE ClTizNsanP
33-61 (1918); Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several
States (pt. 2), 1 MIcH. L. REv. 364 (1903). The group of rights held fundamental
under the privileges and immunities clause differs from the group held fundamental
under the equal protection clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court's
criterion for fundamentality under the equal protection clause is not the one stated
in Corfield, see text accompanying note 3 supra. Rather, it is whether or not theparticular individual interest is expressly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). For
a list of the rights declared fundamental under the equal protection clause, see
Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 29 STAN. L. REv. 663, 710 n.223 (1977).
7 See, e.g., Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890) (selling liquor).
8
See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877) (oysters).
9 See R. HOWELL, =supra note 6, at 62-79; Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States (pt. 1), 1 MIcH. L. REv. 286 (1903).
10 Throughout this Article, I use state "residence" synonymously with "citizenship" or "domicile," words which traditionally have been used to indicate the state
in which one makes his or her home or, more specifically, the state either in which
one lives and intends to remain indefinitely or in which one most recently has lived
with this kind of intent. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 247 (1898); Morris
v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 328-29 (1889); Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 350, 352-53 (1874); R. WEINTRAUB, CoMvMNaRy ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 8-13 (1971). Also, I generally speak in terms of "residence" rather than
"citizenship" or "domicile" because laws discriminating against out-of-staters typically are phrased in terms of "residence." See Knox, Prospective Applications of
the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution,
43 Mo. L. REv. 1, 9 & n.54 (1978).
I assume for present purposes the validity of the Supreme Court's view that the
nonresidents protected by the privileges and immunities clause do not include corporations and aliens. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 n.15 (1978Y
(aliens); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-82 (1869) (corporations).
11 For example, the Court at times seized upon the possible distinction between.
"citizenship" and "residence" as a pretext for upholding reasonable residence classifications. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929);
LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); B. CurE, SELECTE EssAys ONTHE CONFLICT OF LAws 470-73 (1963); L. TamE, supra note 3, § 6-32, at 408.
Although state "residence" frequently is used interchangeably with "citizenship" to.
denote the state in which one makes his or her home, it is also used to denote the
state in which one currently lives with or without an intent to stay permanently
4

See Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAxD. L. REv. 561, 564

(1953).

The Court's tactic thus consisted of construing a statutory reference to.
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In more recent years, the Court has committed itself explicitly
2
-to a reasonableness test like the one that it at least on occasion
tacitly had applied in the past. Most notably, in a passage that, .as
Hicklin v. Orbeck confirms, 13 remains authoritative today, the Court
-declared in 1948 in Toomer v. Witsell:
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges
and immunities clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is
no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the
mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does
not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations
where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it.
Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with
whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of
discrimination bears a close relation to them. The inquiry
must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the
principle that the States should have considerable leeway
in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate
14
cures.
In addition, although the Court's opinions in Toomer and a later
case, Doe v. Bolton, 5 appeared to intimate that the Court no longer
"residence" in this latter sense and then finding no privileges and immunities violation on the theory that the clause speaks to discrimination on the basis of citizenship alone. As argued forcefully in B. CUIUE, supra at 470, any distinction between
"residence" and "citizenship" is necessarily irrelevant because, if it were relevant,
it would afford states a relatively painless way to circumvent the clause. At the
expense only of its citizens living temporarily outside the state, a state would be
able to discriminate against the overwhelming majority of noncitizens-all but those
living temporarily in the state-as much as it pleased. The Court's latest decisions
essentially repudiate the relevance of this distinction to analysis under the clause.
See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 397 (1948).
For examples and discussion of other techniques employed by the Court to
-avoid the results dictated by its announced approach, see L. TamE, supra note 3,
§ 6-32, at 407-08 & n.26; Note, The Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
FederalConstitution, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 347 (1928).
12 Commentators differ in their assessments of the Court's consistency in applying its unarticulated reasonableness test. Compare L. TmE, supra note 3, § 6-32,
at 408 ("The reasonableness exception thus tempered the otherwise rigid impact of
-the privileges and immunities clause but did so in an unpredictable and seemingly
arbitrary manner.") with B. Cunnm, supra note 11, at 468-73, 473 (the Court's
activities generally are explicable in terms of a "'reasonable classification' principle').
13 See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1978).
14 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (footnote omitted).
15410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). In Doe, the companion case to Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court found, among other things, that Georgia's law
allowing only state residents to obtain abortions in Georgia violated the privileges
and immunities clause.
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takes seriously the need to decide fundamentality, 1 the Court subsequently has affirmed that this determination remains a vital part
of its approach: in 1978, it squarely rested its approval of the law
in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission on a finding that the right
at issue, elk hunting for sport, was not fundamental. 17 The Toomer
reasonableness test, with its demand for a "substantial" relationship
between means and end,1 8 therefore does not apply to all laws discriminating against people domiciled outside the state, but only to
ones that affect rights thought to be fundamental. Laws disadvantaging nonresidents as to rights not fundamental for purposes of
the privileges and immunities clause may overstep the bounds of
lawful discrimination set by the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause 19 or may conflict with other constitutional guarantees.20 Under the Court's analysis, however, they do not violate the
privileges and immunities clause.
In this Article, I do not challenge the Court's various express
and implicit determinations over the years with regard to the fundamentality of certain privileges and immunities and with regard to
the reasonableness of specific residence classifications. Instead, I
16 See L. TamE, supra note 3, § 6-33, at 410-11.
17436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
18The Court in Toomer used the phrase "substantial reason" to refer to the
means-end relationship alone and not to the weightiness of the state's goal. 334
U.S. 385, 398 (1948) (allusion to "valid objectives"); id. 398-99 (attention exclusively to whether or not "reasonable relationship" exists). See Hicklin v. Orbeck,
437 U.S. 518, 527 (1978) (Toomer test stated in terms of whether discrimination
against nonresidents bears "a substantial relationship to the particular 'evil' they
are said to present"); B. CummE, supra note 11, at 473 (under Toomer, classification must be "reasonably related to legitimate policy"); L. TamE, supra note 3,
§ 6-33, at 411 n.17 ("The Toomer Court spoke only in terms of substantial connection to valid state objectives.") (Emphasis in original).
19 In State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CaL.
L. REv. 61, 86 (1978), I maintained that, in keeping with its reasons for declaring
race to be a "suspect" basis for classification under the equal protection clause, the
Court should treat residence classifications as suspect. In fact, however, the Court
has not treated them as such. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371, 388-91 (1978). It has acted on the premise that, in and of itself, classification by residence triggers rational basis review rather than the "strict scrutiny"
associated with suspect classifications. Under the Court's approach, the only justification for reviewing a residence classification with any amount of rigor lies in the
importance of the individual interest at issue. See Simson, supra note 6, at 663-64.
20 For example, the "dormant" or unexercised commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power . ..To regulate Commerce .. .
among the several States ....
), is an important check on laws discriminating
against nonresidents. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 99 S. Ct. 1727 (1979)
(invalidating statute prohibiting transportation of natural minnows out of state for
sale); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (invalidating statute
prohibiting transportation of natural gas out of state for sale unless local needs
already satisfied). See generally Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power,
27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940).
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seek to demonstrate that the Court's two-step approach requiring
these determinations represents an inadequate conception of the
framers' intent in adopting the privileges and immunities clause.
Part I argues that the purposes underlying the privileges and immunities clause indicate its applicability to any privilege or immunity granted to residents but denied to nonresidents. Part II
suggests that, although a literal reading of the clause is untenable,
its language calls for more rigorous review of residence classifications
than the Court's reasonableness test affords. Finally, part III examines the implications of my proposed interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause for some of the principal types of
residence classifications currently in effect.
I. THE ScoPE OF THE CLAUSE
Although not extensive, the available evidence of the framers'
aims in drafting the privileges and immunities clause establishes
that the clause at least partly was designed to minimize friction
among the people of the various states and among the states themselves. 21 The clause is an abbreviated version of the fourth article
of the Articles of Confederation, an article which began with an
affirmation of the importance to national unity of extending to outof-staters the privileges and immunities enjoyed locally:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship
and intercourse among the people of the different States in
this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States,
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted,
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free
22
citizens in the several States ....
In a pamphlet published contemporaneously with the framing of
the Constitution, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, the delegate
to the Constitutional Convention generally recognized as the author
of the Constitution's privileges and immunities clause, 23 character21 See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975); Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869); R. Howr., supra note 6, at 13.
22
ARTCLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
23
See 5 J. EraaoT, DEBATES ON Tm AoPTION oF THE FmERA.L CoNsTrrurno,
128-29, 132 (rev. ed. 1845); Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 6 (1967); Meyers, supra note 9, at 287. But see R. HowELL, supra note 6, at
14-15. Pinckney specifically claimed authorship of the clause in a speech on the
floor of Congress in 1821. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1134 (1821). Furthermore, the
clause appears verbatim in the draft of the Pinckney Plan-the plan of government
submitted by Pinckney to the Constitutional Convention-that Pinckney made
available to John Quincy Adams in 1818 for inclusion in Adams's journal of the

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

384

[Vol. 128:379

ized the clause as "formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th
article of the present Confederation." 24 Moreover, since the delegates to the Constitutional Convention adopted virtually without
debate the privileges and immunities clause submitted to them by
the Committee of Detail, 25 it seems reasonable to infer that familiar
principles-specifically, those spelled out in the provision of the
Articles of Confederation on which the clause plainly was basedwere widely understood to inform the clause. Lastly, in a brief
allusion in The Federalist to the privileges and immunities clause
of the new Constitution, Alexander Hamilton provides further support for the claim that the clause was drafted with interstate harmony and cooperation in mind. According to Hamilton, the clause
"may be esteemed the basis of the Union." 26
In view of the framers' deep commitment to representative
government,2 7 it also seems appropriate to suppose that, in placing
some constraints on states' freedom to discriminate against nonresidents, the framers were moved in part by democratic ideals.
Basically, laws disadvantaging nonresidents, outsiders in the fullest
sense to the enacting state's legislative process, clash with principles
of government that the drafters of the Constitution held in highest
esteem. Laws of this sort epitomize government without the consent of the governed. 28 At first glance, the suggestion that these
concerns played any part at all in the adoption of the privileges and
immunities clause may appear unusual: after all, residents ineligible
to vote also are outsiders to the political process, yet they received
no federal constitutional protection against unjust discrimination
by the state until the fourteenth amendment became law in
Convention.

1868.2

9

(The secretary of the Convention was unable to provide Adams with

the actual document that Pinckney presented to the Convention.)

See 3 THE

REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENIoN OF 1787, at 426-28, 601 (M. Farrand ed.

1911).

Some scholars have questioned the extent to which the draft offered in

1818 corresponds to the still missing document submitted to the Convention.

id. 601-04.

See

They seem to concede, however, that the privileges and immunities

clause adopted by the Convention originated with Pinckney. See id. 604, 606-07.
243 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENION OF 1787, supra note 23, at

112.

G.

25 See 2 id. 437, 443, 456.
26
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
27 See U.S. CoNsT. preamble;
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE

id. art. I, §§ 2-4; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. IV, § 4;
AmEIcAr lEPuric 1776-1787, at 532-36, 593-

604 (1969).
28 See L. TamE, supra note 3, § 6-33, at 411 n.17; Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REv. 451, 465 (1978). Cf.
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) (calling attention in a privileges and immunities context to the fact that "nonresidents are not represented in
the taxing State's legislative halls").
29See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; note 19 supra.
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Compared to nonresidents, however, residents ineligible to vote may
well have seemed to the framers to be politically well off. The
drafters of article IV reasonably may have anticipated that, unlike
nonresidents, this class of residents often would be protected in the
political arena by enfranchised residents peculiarly interested in
their well-being by virtue of kinship or other ties.3 0
If the framers adopted the privileges and immunities clause for
either or both of the above reasons, it is not plausible that they
intended coverage by the clause of particular privileges and immunities to depend on whether they are ones, in the words of Corfield
v. Coryell, "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong,
of right, to the citizens of all free governments." 31 First, the relationship between the fundamental or nonfundamental character of
a privilege or immunity and the amount of interstate friction generated by its selective denial to nonresidents is highly speculative.
The friction created by discrimination as to fundamental rights is
not obviously substantial, while that created by discrimination as to
nonfundamental rights is not obviously insubstantial. Indeed, it is
not at all clear that friction from the former type of discrimination
is always greater than friction from the latter.3 2 Second, the fundamental or nonfundamental nature of a right is irrelevant to the
extent to which a law that discriminates against nonresidents with
regard to the enjoyment of that right satisfies democratic norms.
The only factor relevant in this respect is nonresidents' exclusion
from the political process that disadvantaged them.
More broadly, these two explanations for the special solicitude
shown nonresidents by the drafters of the privileges and immunities
clause imply not only that the fundamental or nonfundamental character of a privilege or immunity is irrelevant to its protection under
the clause. They also imply that no one privilege or immunity is
301 have suggested elsewhere that similar concerns about the vulnerability of
particular groups in the political process inform the Court's suspect classification
doctrine. See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237,
1250-58 (1974).
316 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
32But cf. Baldwin v. Fish & Came Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383, 388 (1978):
Only with respect to those "privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the
vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens,
resident and nonresident, equally....
. . . Equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union.... Whatever rights or activities may
be "fundamental" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we are
persuaded, and hold, that elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is not
one of them.
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inherently any more or less deserving of protection than another.
First, an attempt to rank privileges and immunities in terms of the
relative impact on national unity of their discriminatory allocation
seems entirely too hypothetical, too impervious to principled application, to be fairly located within the framers' intent.33 Second, an
attempt to rank privileges and immunities in terms of the relative
inconsistency with democratic ideals of their discriminatory allocation cannot help but be unsuccessful because the source of this inconsistency-nonresidents' lack of input into the process that singled
them out for disadvantage-does not vary from right to right. If
some residence classifications should be upheld under the clause and
others struck down, the reason thus is not that some rights are more
important than others for purposes of the clause. All rights fall
within its scope.
II. A

STANDARD OF REVIEW

If the framers' goals in protecting nonresidents from discrimination were those that I have described, they also militate in favor of
reading the privileges and immunities clause as a blanket prohibition on residence classifications. By invalidating even the most
reasonable residence classifications, a court promotes both of these
ends. Although residence classifications supported by weighty state
justifications generally may be less offensive to nonresidents and less
provocative to sister states than wholly arbitrary classifications, it is
not at all evident that any interstate friction that they create is constitutionally insignificant. Furthermore, a residence classification
closely related to a legitimate state goal may well be "fairer" in
some objective sense than one that irrationally discriminates against
nonresidents, but it is no less objectionable in terms of government
by the consent of the governed.
On its face, the privileges and immunities clause appears to
constitutionalize the blanket prohibition that these underlying
policies suggest. It speaks in absolute, uncompromising terms-noncitizens "shall be entitled" to "all" privileges and immunities3 4
There should be little question, however, that, whether or not the
framers actually thought about the implications of disallowing all
residence classifications, they did not "intend," in any realistic sense
-3 On the various levels of generality at which the framers' intent may be
understood, see P. BnEsT, CONSTrrUTIONAL DECISIONMAXING 41-44 (1975), and
sources cited therein. The claim made in the text is that such an attempt to rank
privileges and immunities does not fall within the broadest conception of the
framers' intent.
34 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, ci. 1.
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of the word,85 for the clause to be interpreted literally. Most obviously, it would have been odd to say the least for the framers to
prohibit states entirely from using residence classifications while
they themselves made state residence relevant in article I both to a
person's eligibility to represent a state in the House or Senate 16 and
to the size of a state's delegation in the House. 87 More important,
however, the framers could not have intended to incapacitate states
totally from disadvantaging nonresidents because the effect would
have been to destroy the integrity of one of the basic units of the
federal system that they envisioned-the state. Very simply, if states
could not limit to their residents voting in state-wide elections and
holding of high elected office, they would cease to be the separate
political communities that history and the constitutional text make
38
plain were contemplated.
If the privileges and immunities clause thus cannot logically
be read to say what it appears to be saying, it may be plausible to
assume, as the Court does, that it is saying a good deal less. Indeed,
in calling for a substantial nexus to a legitimate end, 39 the Toomer
reasonableness test arguably demands in "fundamental" rights contexts more than the clause's due. For the many years before the
equal protection clause was added to the Constitution, the privileges
and immunities clause was nonresidents' only federal constitutional
protection against discrimination. As a result, without denying that
it served a meaningful role at the time of its adoption, the privileges
and immunities clause may be construed as a bar on only wholly
arbitrary residence classifications.
Considerably more plausible, however, is the assumption that
the clause means something fairly close to the ordinary connotation
of its words. To be sure, the obvious exceptions to a strict reading
of the clause-restrictions on voting and office-holding-do establish
that the framers could not have intended to subordinate all state
interests to the national policies behind equal treatment of residents
and nonresidents. The state's justification for these exceptions is so
potent, however, that their existence hardly implies that the framers
chose their words carelessly in drafting the clause and that the words
See note 33 supra.
§ 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
37 U. S. CONST. art L § 2, cl. 3.
38
See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972);
L. FeeDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERCAN LAW 30-32, 60-81, 93-101 (1973); Simson,
supra note 19, at 71; text accompanying notes 66-72 infra.
39 See note 18 supra.
35

36 U.S. CONST. art. I,
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therefore are most appropriately ignored. Rather, the existence of
these particular exceptions is fully consistent with the notion that
the framers used language calculated to convey a general rule or
presumption of unconstitutionality that would yield only in an
extreme case.
Basically, then, I propose that the Court approach the mandate
of the privileges and immunities clause in much the same way as it
40
does the seemingly unyielding prohibition of the first amendment.
The Court's response to the need to find room in the first amendment for some limitations on free expression has not been to assume
that the first amendment's "no law" admonition means simply "no
unreasonable law." Instead, its response has been to place a heavy
41
burden of justification on any law materially abridging speech.
The particular accommodation of federal and state interests
that I believe best reflects the framers' specific aims in drafting the
privileges and immunities clause and their general goals for the
federal system is summarized by a standard of review that invalidates
any residence classification not shown by the state to be necessary to
serve a significantstate objective.42 On the one hand, this standard
strikes the balance heavily in favor of the policies underlying the
forceful prohibition on discrimination expressed in the clause. It
vindicates these policies unless the state carries the heavy burden of
proving that classification on the basis of state residence is the most
effective means available to it for serving an important goal. If the
state can serve its goal as precisely by alternative means not beyond
its capacity to implement, these policies therefore prevail. 43 On the
40 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech .... ").
41 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
COURT 218 (1960):
(1939). In general, see C. BLAcK, THE PEoPLE AND T
[I]n view of the absolute character of the language of the [First] Amendment, and of the secondary and implicational nature of the reasons for
disregarding it in part, it seems to me reasonable to cast on the governmental agency that would introduce an exception the burden of establishing that it is a valid exception, and not to cast on the man whose speech
is being abridged the burden of showing that the exception is not a valid
exception. (Emphasis in original.)
42 Contrast the Court's approach, described at text accompanying notes 12-20
"upra.
43 The imperfection of a residence classification is a good, but not conclusive,
indicator that the classification lacks the necessary means-end relationship required
by the proposed standard of review. An imperfect classification is necessary when
the state cannot make the classification more precise without impairing severely its
ability to govern effectively, see Simson, supra note 6, at 679-80, 687 n.121, or when
the goal being served resists by its very nature more precise implementation, see
text accompanying notes 76-77, 80-81 infra.
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other hand, this standard recognizes that, as the decisionmaking
bodies traditionally vested with primary authority and responsibility
to provide for the general welfare, states have a strong claim to use
residence classifications essential to further ends that are important,
though perhaps not critical or "compelling," 4 to their residents'
well-being.40 Residence classifications for purposes of voting and
office-holding no doubt would satisfy the more stringent require46
ment that the state's interest be not only significant but compelling.
As the following discussion invites one to infer, however, few other
necessary residence classifications would meet this higher test. The
effect of requiring a compelling rather than a significant state interest almost certainly would be to narrow substantially states'
prerogatives and opportunities for experimentation.
III. THE

STANDARD APPLIED

A. Bar Admissions
One of the most common types of residence classifications is
the statute or court-made rule making residence a qualification for
admission to the state bar.47 According to various courts and com44The term "compelling" is the one commonly used by the Court in equal
protection and other individual-rights contexts to indicate a governmental interest
of the highest order. See Simson, supra note 6, at 675-77, 679.
45The difference between a state's interest in promoting its residents' wellbeing and its interest in advantaging its residents over nonresidents should be kept
in mind. The former interest is a perfectly valid one in light of the special reciprocal relationship between a state and its residents, the persons who make the state
their home. They are the individuals "most likely to benefit or burden its operations." Simson, supra note 19, at 75. In contrast, the latter interest is unconstitutional because it in effect is nothing more than an interest in frustrating the
enjoyment of one's core right under the privileges and immunities clause to be free
from discrimination based solely upon the fact of one's nonresidence. For further
discussion of unconstitutional objectives, see Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 589-91 (1975);
Simson, Abortion, Poverty and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 GA. L. REv.
505, 513 n.44 (1979). In some instances, then, a state legitimately may disadvantage nonresidents relative to residents as a means to promote its residents' wellbeing, but it may never disadvantage nonresidents relative to residents as an end
in and of itself.
46 Cf. Simson, supra note 6, at 677 (compelling nature of laws vital to "governmental stability and effectiveness" derives from the state's "need to protect its
ability to function effectively in the people's behalf").
47
See NATIoNAL BAR ExAmINTIo N DIGEST (1979); Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 71 MIcH. L. REv.
838, 838 n.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Micir. L. REV.]. States often require for
admission to the bar not only residence but also residence for a specified period of
time. See NATIONAL BAR EXAMInATION DicEsT, supra; MiGH. L. REv., supra at
838 n.2. Since durational residence requirements disadvantage short-term residents
as well as nonresidents, they raise some equal protection problems not generated
by pure residence requirements. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
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mentators, laws of this sort protect the public from attorneys incompetent in local law, 48 screen out morally unfit lawyers, 49 and
facilitate the smooth and efficient administration of justiceP °
Under the proposed standard of review, these laws are unconstitutional because, even assuming that the objectives that they serve
are significant, 1 they serve none of these objectives with the necessity that the privileges and immunities clause demands.

2

First, if the state wishes to safeguard people from lawyers not
skilled in the intricacies of its law, a residence classification is an
almost irrational means of doing so. As a result of day-to-day contact with the state and its people, resident attorneys conceivably
may acquire knowledge about local customs and events that they
otherwise would not have acquired and that deepens their underU.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Simson, supra note
6, at 698-701. The fact that laws of this sort disadvantage some residents, however,
does not place them beyond the reach of the privileges and immunities clause.
Any classification that disadvantages all nonresidents implicates the concerns about
national unity and representative government that underlie the clause. Moreover,
on a less abstract level, if the fact that a law disadvantaged some residents indeed.
did mean that nonresidents could not attack it successfully under the privileges and
immunities clause, the clause would be virtually inconsequential. States rarely, if
ever, treat all residents better than all nonresidents because, after classifying between residents and nonresidents, they typically differentiate among residents in
terms of age, skills, need, or other characteristics relevant to lawful state goals.
48
See Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice,80 HA-Rv. L. REv. 1711,
1716 (1967).
49 See MicH. h REv., supra note 47, at 848-49.
50 See Application of Titus, 213 Va. 289, 294-95, 191 S.E.2d 798, 802 (1972)Critics of residence requirements for the bar have claimed that a fourth purpose,
eliminating out-of-state competition, is an important and perhaps dominant force
behind such requirements. See, e.g., Dalton & Williamson, State Barriers Against
Migrant Lawyers, 25 U. KANi. CrrY L. REV. 144, 14748 (1957); Note, Residence
Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Compromise Proposal for Change,
56 CoNEI
L. REv. 831, 837 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ConwmL L. Rmv.].
Because this purpose seeks to achieve a result that the commerce clause was designed to prevent, it is not a legitimate state interest and therefore does not arguably support denying nonresidents admission to the bar. For more on illegitimate
purposes, see note 45 supra.
5xThis qualification, one intended to emphasize that the absence in the text
of any discussion of the importance of particular objectives neither endorses nor
disputes their "significant" status, will not be reiterated elsewhere in part III. It
should be understood as implicit, however, in any instance in which, without
reaching the issue of the importance of a specific objective, I claim that a residence
classification is insupportable in terms of that objective.
52The Court has never ruled on the constitutionality under the privileges and
immunities clause of a residence requirement for admission to the bar. In Suffling
v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020, aff'g mem. 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N. Mex. 1972)
(three-judge court), however, it summarily affirmed a lower court decision rejecting
an equal protection challenge to a six-month durational residence requirement. For
a recent attempt to apply the Supreme Court's two-step privileges and immunities
approach to residence requirements for admission to the bar, see Note, A ConsHtutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HAnv. L. REv. 1461 (1979).
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standing of local law. This potential benefit associated with state
residence is so slight and hypothetical, however, that residence in
one's state of practice offers virtually no promise of competence in
local law and residence outside of the state holds no real threat of
incompetence 5 3 Instead, adequacy in this respect almost certainly
turns on factors such as prior education, diligence, and research
techniques. A state concerned about providing its people with
lawyers well-versed in local law far more reasonably would pursue
alternatives, such as improving the methods of testing bar applicants' familiarity with its law and requiring lawyers to pass periodic
examinations on issues of state law as a condition to continued
practice in the state.
Second, a residence classification for bar admissions is also
highly imprecise in identifying persons not morally fit to practice
law in the state. Some resident attorneys arguably behave more
ethically than they would if they lived outside their state of practice,
because they feel a personal stake in the welfare of the community
most immediately affected by their work and because they are more
susceptible to pressures from the local bar and community to act
responsibly. Any correlation between ethical behavior and in-state
residence, however, is marginal at best. Many nonresidents can be
expected to practice law honestly in the state, and some resident
attorneys can be expected to do so reprehensibly, because the individual lawyer's personal code of ethics and moral fortitude influence
behavior much more than his or her place of residence. 4 If a state
is serious about limiting admission to its bar to persons whose behavior will be beyond reproach, it has available to it demonstrably
more effective means of pursuing its goal than a residence requirement. In particular, it can devote materially more resources to
investigating bar applicants' backgrounds 55 and to enforcing its
code of professional ethics.
Finally, a prohibition on nonresidents becoming members of
the state bar is a needlessly severe means of coping with any problems that an attorney's out-of-state residence may pose for the administration of justice in the state. For example, although a residence requirement for admission to the bar helps ensure that clients
wishing to sue their attorneys for malpractice will not find themselves faced with the inconvenience of bringing causes of action outL. REv., supra note 50, at 838.
See id. 838-39.
55 Traditionally, such investigations have been lax. See Note, Restrictions on
Admission to the Bar: By-Product of Federalism, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 710, 711 (1950)
Thereinafter cited as U. PA. L. BEv.].
53 See Comn.i
54
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side their home state, it is hardly a necessary device for securing this
end. A long-arm statute giving the state's courts personal jurisdiction over nonresident attorneys in suits for wrongs committed in
the course of their practice in the state accomplishes the purpose
equally well. Similarly, while the exclusion of nonresidents from
the bar alleviates certain difficulties for local courts and opposing
counsel with regard to serving notices and pleadings, statutes providing for service by mail can achieve substantially the same result. 5
B. Public Office and Employment
States typically disqualify nonresidents from holding elected
office 57 and from working for the state in various nonelected
capacities.5 8 In addition, they often grant residents a preference in
competing for certain state jobs.59 Laws disadvantaging nonresidents in these ways generally have been explained in terms of one
or more of three goals: reducing unemployment in the state,60 minimizing turnover in state personnel, 6' and preserving the state's
political integrity.P Under the privileges and immunities test
previously set forth, residence classifications premised on either of
the first two objectives are unconstitutional, while in some instances
ones premised on the third objective are not.63
56 See Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, supra note 48, at 1715;
U. PA. L. REV., supra note 55, at 718. In both examples in the above text, unless the
state supplements its residence requirement for admission to the bar with a
continuing residence requirement for practicing in the state after admission,
the suggested alternatives serve the state's goals not simply as well as, but instead
materially better than, the residence classifications employed. According to a recent
study, New York is the only state with a continuing residence requirement of this
sort. A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residence Requirements Under the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, supra note 52, at 1487.
57E.g., N.H. CoNsr. pt. 2, art. 14 (state representative); VA. CoNST. art. V,
§ 3 (governor).
58 E.g., HAwAII REV. STAT. § 78-1(b) (Supp. 1978) (all state, county, and
municipal employment); Mo. ANa. STAT. § 36.050(1) (Vernon Supp. 1979) (state
personnel advisory board).
59 E.g., N.J. STAT. ArN. § 34:9-2 (West 1965) (public works); N.Y. CrvuSEaVICE DEP'T RULEs & REcULATIONS § 3.1 (1972) (classified civil service).
60 See Brief for State of Hawaii, Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
U.S. 518 (1978).
61 See State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 150 (Alas. Sup. Ct. 1973).
62 See Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (D.N.H.) (three-judge
court), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
63
In Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and Crane v. New York, 239 U.S.
195 (1915), the Court upheld a New York law requiring preference for state residents in employment on public works projects. The petitioners had claimed violations of various constitutional provisions, including the privileges and immunities
clause. The Court's theory in allowing the discrimination to stand essentially was
that the state "owned" the jobs at issue and therefore could allocate them as it
wished. The extent to which Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), qualifies
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First of all, if the state wishes to ensure that its citizens are
gainfully employed, a residence classification is no better than a
plausible means of doing so. On the one hand, if the state hires
any of its residents already employed in the private sector, it furthers
its goal only to the uncertain extent that private employers hire
unemployed residents to fill the openings created. On the other
hand, the state can serve its objective at least as effectively by jobtraining programs and other less drastic means. 4
Similarly, as a device to avoid the disruption to governmental
operations caused by rapid turnovers in state personnel, classifying
by residence is manifestly flawed. On the one hand, it is patently
under- and overinclusive. Although, by definition, state residence
indicates an intent to make one's home in the state for the foreseeable future,65 it is no guarantee that someone will continue to work
for the state in one capacity for a substantial period of time.
Furthermore, though implying an intent to settle outside the state,
nonresidence does not necessarily mean-especially with regard to
nonresidents who live permanently within daily commuting distance
of places of public employment in the state-that someone will remain in a state job only briefly. On the other hand, by alternative
means such as monetary and fringe-benefit rewards for lengthy
tenure in a state job, the state can limit personnel turnover with
greater success.
In contrast, as discussed briefly with respect to high elected
office, 66 some residence classifications denying nonresidents opporthis proprietary interest theory remains to be seen. The Court emphasized in
Hicklin that the Alaska statute under review "extends to employers who have no
connection whatsoever with the State's oil and gas, perform no work on state land,
have no contractual relationship with the State, and receive no payment from the
State," id. 530, and held that the privileges and immunities clause prevents Alaska
from requiring private employers to prefer State residents for, in the words of the
statute, "all employment which is a result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases
or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes, unitization agreements or
any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the state is a party after July 7,
1972," ALAs. STAT. ANN. § 38.40.050(a) (1977). See also Hicklin, 437 U.S. at
531 n.15 (distinguishing Heim and Crane on the ground that the Court in those
cases did not rule expressly on the privileges and immunities objection raised).
In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comn'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), the Court stated
in dictum that "[n]o one would suggest" that the privileges and immunities clause
requires states to allow nonresidents to run for public office. Id. 383. Moreover,
the Court's indulgent attitude toward residence classifications for office-holding is
evidenced by its summary affimance of a decision that a seven-year durational
residence requirement for governor comports with the equal protection clause. See
Chimento v. Stark, 414 U.S. 802, aff'g mem. 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973)
(three-judge court).
64 See State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 149 & n.14 (Alas. Sup. Ct. 1973).
65 See note 10 supra.
O See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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tunities to serve or work for the state are necessary to promote the
state's compelling end of maintaining its intended place in the
federal system as a discrete political entity. More specifically, in
order to carry out its traditional function of deciding autonomously
which policies to pursue in its people's best interests, the state must
limit to its residents, the class of persons who identify with it most
closely, any public office or employment involving substantial discretion in making policy decisions that significantly affect the general welfare. Thus, at one end of the spectrum, the state leg-itimately may make state residence a qualification to run for governor
or to be appointed to the state board of education. At the other
end, the state may not validly make state residence a qualification
to run for local dogcatcher or to be hired for the custodial staff in a
state office building. Between these extremes, many close cases
obviously will arise, and the Court would be expected to identify
the end of the spectrum to which they are closest. In the course of
deciding the range of opportunities for public office and employment that a state may deny to resident aliens, the Court in effect
has begun this task. 7 For largely the reasons detailed by several
Justices in dissent,68 however, I am dubious that the Court's performance of this task has been satisfactory to date. In particular,
although the Court may have been correct in Foley v. Connelie 69
and Ambach v. Norwick7 0 in finding that state troopers and public
school teachers exercise considerable discretion in making decisions
that can seriously affect individuals, 71 I cannot agree with its con67 See Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979) (public school teacher);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state trooper); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973) (classified civil servant). The applicable test was stated in
Sugarman: is the position one that calls upon the individual to "participate directly
in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy"? 413 U.S. at 647.
The Court in Sugarman seemed to assume that all elected positions meet this test.
See id. As indicated in the text, I do not regard the elected status of a position
as legitimating under the privileges and immunities clause a state's reserving the
position for its own residents. Rather, the type of policymaking that the elected
position entails is determinative.
68 See Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589, 1597-1601 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 302-07 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. 307-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In particular, consider Justice Marshal's observation in Foley that "the phrase 'execution of broad public policy in
Sugarman cannot be read to mean simply the carrying out of government programs,
but rather must be interpreted to include responsibility for actually setting government policy pursuant to a delegation of substantial authority from the legislature."
435 U.S. at 304.
69435 U.S. 291 (1978).
70

99 S. Ct 1589 (1979).

71 See Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1979):

Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in developing
students' attitude toward government and understanding of the role of
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clusion that these occupations call for the type of broad policy decisions that only a full-fledged member of the body politic should
be allowed to make.7 2
C. PublicHigher Education
In administering state-supported colleges, graduate schools, and
professional schools, states ordinarily require nonresidents to pay
considerably higher tuition than residents.7 3 They also typically
limit the number of places available to nonresidents.7 4 As long as
the tuition charged nonresidents does not exceed the costs of educating them, a residence classification for tuition purposes survives
the rigorous scrutiny that, under my analysis, the privileges and
immunities clause prescribes. Classifying by residence for admiscitizens in our society.... In shaping the students' experience to achieve
educational goals, teachers by necessity have wide discretion over the way
the course material is communicated to students;
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978): "Clearly the exercise of police authority calls for a very high degree of judgment and discretion, the abuse or misuse
of which can have serious impact on individuals."
72

In dismissing an equal protection challenge to a New Jersey law requiring
police to make their home in the city where they work, the court in Krzewinsld v.
Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972) (three-judge court), relied primarily upon
a state interest other than one of the three mentioned above-specifically, the
interest in ensuring community respect for and cooperation with law enforcement
personnel. It accepted the view expressed in a presidential task force report that
"'local residence avoids the impression that the police come from the outside world
to impose law and order on the poor and minority groups and also avoids the risk
of police isolation from the needs, morals and customs of the community .... .
Id. 500 (quoting ThE PnismErr's CommsssroN oN LAw ENFoRcEmENT AND T
ADmnmTsRAw o oF Jus-ncE, TAsK Focxe REPORT: THE PoLicE (1967)). Under
the proposed privileges and immunities standard of review, it is dubious that this
state interest peculiar to the municipal law enforcement context explains adequately
the discrimination against out-of-staters effected by the New Jersey law, which has
been repealed, and others like it, e.g., MAss. CFN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 58 (1979).
Although a municipal residence requirement may be helpful as a means of maintaining healthy relations between the community and the persons charged with
keeping its members within lawful bounds, it probably is not necessary to this end.
Greater care and sophistication in recruiting, training, and supervising police would
appear to be an equally or more effective means of securing the community's confidence and good will. Finally, for essentially the reasons set forth in note 47
supra, the fact that laws classifying by municipal residence disadvantage some
state residents along with all out-of-staters does not preclude their invalidation
under the privileges and immunities clause. See Fecheimer v. Louisville, 84 Ky.
306, 2 S.W. 65 (1886); State v. Nolan, 108 Minn. 170, 122 N.W. 255 (1909).
But see R. How.r., supra note 6, at 45-47.
73

See Bomstein, Residency Laws and the College Student, 1 J.L. & ED. 349,
350-56 (1972); Clarke, Validity of Discriminatory Nonresident Tuition Charges in
Public Higher Education Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause,
50 NEB. L. REv. 31 (1971).
74

See Bornstein, supra note 73, at 351; Knox, supra note 10, at 1.

396

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[VOL 128:379

sions purposes, however, fails to satisfy this elevated standard of
review.7 5
A practice of charging nonresident students for all or most of
the costs of educating them while asking resident students to pay
relatively little or nothing for their education is valid due to a
combination of factors. First, although the objective served by this
practice-the fair distribution of the costs of funding public higher
education in the state-probably is not critical to the general welfare, it is no less than significant to the people's well-being. Second
and less obviously, the relationship between this practice and the
objective that it serves is a necessary one. When the state requires
nonresident but not resident students to compensate the state's taxpayers fully or in large part for the costs of their education, it takes
into account as precisely as possible the disparate contributions
made over time to the state's treasury by resident students and their
parents, on the one hand, and by nonresident students and their
parents, on the other.7 6 Thus, although most, if not all, nonresident
students no doubt pay some taxes to the state during their years at
the state school, and many nonresident students' parents may have
occasion to pay some taxes to the state as well, resident students and
their parents typically pay far more. Unlike nonresident students,
resident students-personally and through their parents-generally
have paid, are paying, and will continue to pay taxes to the state
for owning property, earning income, and consuming goods and
services within it. Furthermore, although the assumption that resident students' contributions to the state treasury differ dramatically
from those of nonresident students obviously is imperfect, the classification that it helps explain is as precise as possible in light of the
impossibility of predicting future contributions with any degree of
exactness.
The unconstitutionality of nonresident admissions quotas derives from their less-than-necessary correlation to either of the two
goals that they are designed to serve: protecting the fiscal integrity
of a system that offers the state's residents tuition-free or low-cost
75
The Court's activities in this area include two summary affirmances of decisions upholding durational residence requirements for lower tuition, Sturgis v.
Washington, 414 U.S. 1057, aff'g mem. 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973)
(three-judge court); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), aff'g mem. 326

F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) (three-judge court), and an invalidation on due
process grounds of a state law precluding persons classified as nonresidents at the
time of admission to the state university from establishing resident status for tuition
purposes during their years at the university, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
76 See Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (W.D. Wash.)

(three-

judge court), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp.
117, 123 & n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (three-judge court).
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higher education, 77 and limiting for purposes of educational quality
the size of the state's institutions of higher learning. 78 First, if, as
argued above, the state legitimately may charge nonresidents for the
costs of educating them, it should not need a nonresident admissions
quota to keep the costs of higher education in the state within feasible bounds. The state of course may find it more expensive to offer
residents tuition-free or low-cost higher education without a nonresident quota than with one. In order to accommodate a larger
student body without sacrificing institutional quality, the state may
need, for example, to add faculty and to expand its schools' physical
facilities; and as the state invests in these improvements, the cost
per pupil may well rise.79 With nonresident students being subject
to tuition fees equal to the costs of educating them, however, the
state almost certainly will not find it so much more expensive that
the costs of operating without a quota become insuperable.
Second, the state's option of assessing nonresidents their fair
share of its education bill also makes a nonresident admissions quota
unnecessary for preserving for state residents the advantages of learning in a relatively small, high quality institution. If existing state
schools are inadequate to serve this goal, this option facilitates the
state's funding of additional schools. It keeps any resulting rise in
cost per pupil within feasible bounds. The fact that the state may
not be able to educate as many residents in a particular, existing
institution as it did previously is constitutionally inconsequential,
because the state has no material interest in educating its residents
in a specific school. Instead, its only substantial interest in this
regard is in providing its residents with the type of benefits conferred by the small, quality institution that it esteems.
D. Basic Necessities
States generally allocate welfare and medical assistance benefits
only to their own residents.8 0 In doing so, they conform to the
strictures of the proposed privileges and immunities test because
they serve as well as possible a goal significant to their citizens' wellbeing-the equitable distribution of the costs of alleviating poverty
77

See Bornstein, supra note 73, at 350-51.
78 Cf. Clarke, supra note 73, at 47 (acknowledging special need for admissions
preference for residents in schools "of national excellence or other attractiveness").
79 For a brief discussion of the concepts relevant to a formal economic analysis
of this possibility, see P. SAmuELSON, EcoNowncs 465-71 (10th ed. 1976).
SO E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 6-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MIcH.
CoaP. LAws § 400.55(a) (1976).
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in the state. 81 Although indigent residents who qualify for public
assistance may not at present contribute materially more in taxes to
the state than do indigent nonresidents, the former may have contributed materially more in the past, and the hope is that public
assistance at this time will enable them to become more productive
and contribute materially more in the future. Further, although
the premise that indigent residents ultimately compensate the state's
taxpayers much more adequately than do indigent nonresidents
plainly is inexact, the classification that it supports is as precise as
the state's rather open-ended goal permits.
E. Access to Courts
By statute or common law, courts in various states are authorized to treat a plaintiff's residence outside of the forum state as a
basis for dismissing his or her suit against a nonresident or a foreign
corporation over whom the court has acquired personal jurisdiction. 2 In addition, some states have long-arm statutes that may be
invoked by resident, but not nonresident, plaintiffs in order to sue
nonresidents or foreign corporations in the legislating state's courts
83
with regard to acts performed or to be performed in the state.
Disadvantaging nonresidents in these ways is explained by the state's
interest in protecting local plaintiffs from the ill effects of crowded
dockets.8 4 Under the approach to the privileges and immunities
clause suggested in this Article, these residence classifications should
be struck down because they are not necessary means to this end.8 5
Very simply, although denying nonresidents equal access to courts
is a rational tactic to safeguard resident plaintiffs from harmful
delay, the state is obliged by the privileges and immunities clause
to opt for a less drastic alternative, such as supplementing its judicial
81 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the Court struck down on equal protection
grounds durational residence requirements for state welfare and free nonemergency
medical care, respectively. In both cases, however, the Court appeared to concede

the constitutionality of a pure residence requirement. See 415 U.S. at 267; 394
U.S. at 636-37 & nn.16-17.
82 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Coni'. LAw § 1314(b) (McKinney Supp. 1978); Foss v.
Richards, 126 Me. 419, 139 A. 313 (1927).
83 E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1979).
84 See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929).
85 Although the Court on various occasions has said that access to courts is a
fundamental right under the privileges and immunities clause, e.g., Chambers v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 430 (1870), it has held that laws disadvantaging out-of-staters in this
regard are constitutional as long as they discriminate on the basis of "residence"
rather than "citizenship."

See Southern R.R. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Doug-

las v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
distinction, see note 11 supra.

On the artificiality of this
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resources to accommodate nonresident plaintiffs on an equal basis
with resident ones. It should be emphasized that the state legitimately may use a fee differential to take into account the fact that
the state's residents finance its courts' operations through taxes and
nonresidents generally do not. By tailoring nonresident plaintiffs'
court fees as closely as possible to the burden that they impose on
the state's judicial system, the state would disadvantage nonresidents
in a manner necessary to achieve its significant goal of allocating
equitably the costs of administering its courts.
F. RecreationalLicenses
A majority of states require nonresidents to pay more than residents for licenses to hunt in the state. 6 In addition, some states
either make nonresidents ineligible for licenses to hunt certain types
of game 87 or impose a ceiling on the number of nonresidents who
may be issued hunting licenses for particular species of wildlife.88
For reasons similar to ones already discussed, 9 fee differentials
that achieve as precisely as possible a fair distribution of the costs
to the state of game management and conservation meet the proposed privileges and immunities standard of review. They are
necessary to serve an objective important to popular well-being.
If, on the other hand, the higher fees charged nonresidents exceed
the sum essential to compensate the state's taxpayers for payments
made in nonresidents' behalf, the state's licensing scheme cannot
withstand an attack under the privileges and immunities clause. 90
Schemes of the latter sort bear some nexus to the state's interest in
conserving game for its residents' future hunting and perhaps sight8

6 See Brief for Appellees appendix la-5a, Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371 (1978).
8t E.g., NEv. Ev. STAT. §§ 502.130, 502.250 (1977) (antelope and elk); S.D.
Coramn LAws §§ 41-6-24, 41-8-22 (1977) (far-bearing animals, with several
exceptions).
88
E.g., MoxTr. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 26-202.1(16)(f) (Supp. 1977) (number of
big-game licenses issued to nonresidents not to exceed 17,000); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §20.1-03-11(4) (1978) (number of deer licenses and permits issued to nonresidents not to exceed one percent of total number issued).
s9 See text accompanying notes 76 & 81 supra; text following note 87 supra.
90 In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), the Court approved a fee differential for licenses to hunt elk without denying the correctness of
the lower court's finding, Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
417 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (D. Mont. 1976) (three-judge court), that the differential
did not manifest an effort to achieve as nearly as possible a fair distribution of costs.
See 436 U.S. at 390 ("There is, to be sure, a contrasting cost feature favorable to
the resident, and, perhaps, the details and the figures might have been more precisely fixed and more closely related to basic costs to the State."). The Court's
rationale for rejecting the appellants' privileges and immunities challenge to the
licensing scheme was that, in its view, the right to hunt elk is not fundamentaL
Id. 388.
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seeing enjoyment. The nexus, however, is not remotely a necessary
one. Limits on the total number of resident and nonresident
licenses issued and on the number of animals that a licensee may
kill accomplish the state's goal with far greater precision. 91
The constitutionality under the privileges and immunities
clause of state prohibitions or ceilings on nonresident hunting turns
on the relationship between such measures and two ends not critical
but almost certainly significant to the happiness and prosperity of
the people of the state-the conservation interest named above, and
the objective of maximizing within the boundaries set by the latter
interest the benefits that local residents currently derive from the
wildlife in the state.9 2 If the state can show that the prohibition or
ceiling is part of a conservation effort carefully calculated to maintain the population of the hunted species, the discrimination survives. If it cannot, the law must fall. 93 A state's inability to
document a past or prospective decline in wildlife population or its
failure to regulate residents to the extent necessary for conservation
purposes therefore would call for the invalidation of its law denying
hunting privileges to all or some nonresidents.

IV. Corfield REVISITED
Brainerd Currie once observed that the process of construing
the privileges and immunities clause "got off to a bad start" 9 in the
early circuit court decision of Corfield v. Coryell.95 In this Article,
I have attempted to show that this "bad start" is one from which
the Supreme Court has yet to recover. The Court has remained
faithful to the irrelevant distinction drawn by Corfield between
fundamental and nonfundamental privileges and immunities.
Moreover, perhaps as a reaction to Corfield's extreme suggestion that
all residence classifications affecting fundamental rights are invalid,
91

See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 403-04 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
92 A commercial licensing scheme aimed at maximizing the economic benefits

enjoyed by local residents from the wildlife in the state obviously raises serious
commerce clause problems. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 99 S. Ct. 1727 (1979);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-34 (1978); Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1 (1928).
93 Under the Court's approach in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371 (1978), see note 90 supra, the privileges and immunities clause does not even
require that such prohibitions or ceilings be rationally related to lawful ends. See
also Kemp v. South Dakota, 340 U.S. 923 (1951), dismissing appeal from 73 S.D.
458, 44 N.W.2d 214 (1950) (allowing to stand, for the want of a substantial federal
question, a state court ruling that a law denying nonresidents the opportunity to
hunt migratory waterfowl does not violate the privileges and immunities clause).
94 B. Cumuz, supra note 11, at 460-61.
95 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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the Court before long embraced an unduly noninterventionist
standard of review, a standard which persists today. I do not doubt
that reasonable people-and Justices-may differ with my approach
to the privileges and immunities clause. I am hopeful, however,
that at a minimum I have succeeded in establishing that the time
for the Court to step back and take a fresh look at the clause is
long overdue.

